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Introduction 
 
The Milgram experiment is probably one of the most well known 
experiments of the psy-sciences. Rightly so as the novelist Doris Lessing 
would have it, for according to her the human race has all this “hard 
information about ourselves” remaining unused to improve our institutions 
and therefore our life (Lessing, 1986: 50). The idea that it is to the benefit of 
everybody to spread the psy-theories is held by many psychologists 
themselves. George Miller, the cognitive psychologist, pleaded in his 
presidential address to the American Psychological Association in 1969 to 
“give psychology away”, claiming this is the royal road towards a “psychology 
as a means of promoting human welfare” (Miller, 1969). Later, Miller 
described Milgram’s experiments together with Zimbardo’s Prison 
Experiment, as “being ideal for public consumption of psychological 
research” (cited in Blass, 2002: 208). And indeed, Milgram’s studies, as 
Zimbardo’s, are clearly meant to be spread to a broad audience, the didactic 
and prophylactic objectives permeating the entire experiments from their 
very outset. In this paper, I will explore how the Milgram experiment in this 
way is caught up in the broader processes of psychologization. 
The Milgram experiments took place between 1960 and 1963. Yale 
University psychologist Stanley Milgram wanted to study the willingness to 
obey instructions from an authority figure to perform acts that conflicted 
with one’s personal conscience. He came up with a experimental set-up 
where he could test the levels of obedience when people were ordered to 
punish another person by subjecting him to increasing levels of painful 
electric shocks – this person was a confederate actually receiving no shocks 
at all. Milgram situated his experiments in the tradition of experimentation 
in social psychology referring to Solomon Asch1, Kurt Lewin and others 
(Milgram, 1974: xiv). The work of these latter centred around the notion of 
conformity, which was the concern of social psychologists in the inter-war 
period as it was connected to the developments of the “mass society” (Stam 
et al., 1998: 160)2. Milgram writes that it was the horrors of the Nazi epoch 
which prompted him to shift the focus from conformity and the influence of 
the group, to obedience and the influence of authority (Milgram, 1974: 114-
 
1 Milgram had worked for Solomon Asch in Princeton (Parker*, 2002: 103). Note that this 
Ian Parker* is a British writer living in New-York, and is not to be confused with his 
namesake Ian Parker the critical psychologist from Manchester University, who I will cite 
further on in this paper (hereafter the British writer will be denoted with an * in the text). 
2 For example Asch’s well known line discrimination study in which naïve subjects were 
pressured into making incorrect judgments about the length of lines by group pressure 
(Asch, 1951). 
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115). And so he devised his “Eichman experiment”, as it was called by 
Gordon W. Allport, of whom Milgram was a former student (Milgram, 1974: 
178). Milgram himself indicated that Hannah Arendt’s conception of the 
banality of evil in her comments on the Eichman trial, came close to his own 
experimental findings (Milgram, 1974: 6). 
In the experiment Milgram found high levels of obedience – a 
substantial proportion of his subjects continued to the last shock – and he 
laid down these “both surprising and dismaying” results (Milgram, 1974: 5) 
in an article offered to the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. The 
paper however got rejected with the comment that it was foremost a 
demonstration rather than an experiment (Parker*, 2000: 112). Milgram then 
submitted the article to the Journal of Personality which also turned it down: 
the editor Edward E. Jones wrote: 
 
The major problem is […] your data indicate a kind of triumph of 
social engineering… we are led to no conclusions about obedience, 
really, but rather are exhorted […] to be impressed with the power of 
your situation as an influence context (cited in Parker*, 2000: 112). 
 
Milgram abandoned the paper (Milgram, 1981)3 and, maybe also to save his 
academic career, thoroughly rewrote his account by introducing all kinds of 
variables and their correlations. This new article was published under the 
title Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority in the 
journal Human Relations (Milgram, 1965a). There Milgram wrote that the 
crux of the study is to vary systematically different factors, “to learn under 
what conditions submission to authority is most probable, and under what 
conditions defiance is brought to the fore (Milgram, 1965a: 60)4. In his later 
book On obedience (1974) he eventually describes 18 variants of the base-
line condition of the experiment, varying one variable each time (immediacy 
of the victim, closeness of authority, institutional context…) as the textbooks 
on experimental design require. Science saved by, in Christopher Lasch’s 
words, the classification of trivia (Lash, 1978: 90)? Maybe Milgram’s 
compliance – or do we have to call it obedience to mainstream scientific 
standards – led to both he and his commentators missing a chance: that is 
to analyse further what exactly the alleged triumph of social engineering was 
about.  
Up until today many psy-scientists criticize the experiment as being a 
bad example of serious research. For example, Brannigan denounces 
Milgram’s experiment as a merely experimental dramatization of people’s 
capacity for violence. For Brannigan the results are self-evident and 
 
3 Some months later, however, the editor of Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 
spontaneously recalled the initially rejected paper and published it (see Milgram, 1963). 
4 In the first article he already speaks of varying systematically the factors believed to alter 
the degree of obedience, but there for Milgram the problem “is not one of designing 
increasingly more numerous experimental conditions, but of selecting those that best 
illuminate the process of obedience from the sociopsychological standpoint.” (Milgram, 
1963). 
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tautological, leading to a theoretical dead-end despite the massive public 
attention devoted to the experiment (Brannigan, 2004: 57). Denouncing 
research results as self-evident is of course a rather weak argument, it 
entails the promotion of a science producing unexpected or awkward 
knowledge, revealing things as you never thought they would be.5 And 
surely, much better examples of trivial findings than those of Milgram are to 
be found in the psy-sciences. But foremost, is not the often triumphantly 
declared critique of tautology not all too easy and ready at hand? For, is 
tautology not an essential and maybe inevitable feature of the analysis in 
human and social affairs? Neuro-imaging of aggression for example cannot 
but depart from a certain conception of aggression. The images or the 
discursive material offered to the test-subject to assess what happens on the 
brain-level, do not come out of the blue. It is quite obvious that these 
aggression-triggers are informed explicitly or implicitly by psychological 
theories on aggression. In brain imaging the tautological circle neurology – 
psychology – neurology is always present. As such this is not necessarily 
problematical, only when this is not recognised it will certainly lead to trivial 
research and theoretical dead-ends. But, maybe the most problematical in 
Brannigan’s critique is the brushing aside of the, reluctantly admitted, 
massive public attention Milgram’s experiment enjoyed. What remains thus 
unquestioned is how the experiment came to be such a successful 
demonstration of the effects of power, and thus became such a powerful 
part of popular psychological imagery. For if one maintains that Milgram 
does not explain anything, that it is merely an enactment, then one still has 
to explain what it exactly enacts, what is the scene that Milgram sets up and 
why he does that so well. Maybe Milgram’s enactments are so loathed by the 
serious psy-sciences, because what is enacted belongs to the core of the 
psy-sciences themselves. 
 
The landing strip of individual psychology 
 
What in short is the experiment about? The participant, together with a 
second person who is actually a confederate, are told by an experimenter in 
a grey lab coat that they are to cooperate in a experiment to test the effects 
of punishment on learning. A rigged drawing appoints the naïve subject as 
the teacher and the other person gets the role of learner. The latter is 
strapped into a chair – in the base-line condition situated in an adjacent 
room – with his right hand connected to the so called shock generator. The 
naïve subject takes a place behind the control panel of the shock generator 
and is to conduct a paired-associate learning task via the intercom. He is 
ordered to punish each failure with an electric shock, moreover, with each 
mistake, he has to move one level higher on the shock generator, the 
switches range from 15V to 450V. The experimenter in his lab coat stays in 
the room with the teacher, he is seated behind the subject taking notes.  
 
5 From a psycho-analytical point of view, it is more interesting to focus on the so-called 
evident, as the unconscious is exactly about a knowledge which doesn’t know itself; it is not 
some deep buried unknown secret, it is the self-evident lying at the very surface.  
De Vos, J. (2009) ‘Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment 
and Psychologization’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, pp. 223-246 
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm 
 
 
226 
 
                                                
Milgram filmed the experiment and used this candid footage to edit a 45 
minute film called Obedience (Milgram, 1965b). By far the longest fragment 
in the film features a man called Fred Pozi and also in Milgram’s book of 
1974 the session with Pozi gets much attention. Milgram describes him in a 
psychologists-can-see-through-you style as a good-natured, slightly dissolute 
and ordinary fellow (Milgram, 1974: 73). Pozi begins the experiment calmly 
but gets increasingly tense. He starts to protest at the level of 180V but is 
successfully countered by the standardized monotone phrases of the 
experimenter (“the experiment requires that you continue”). Pozi goes all the 
way, repeating twice the 450V switch as the experimenter prompts him to 
do. While the transcripts of the Pozi-session stops there, the films shows the 
post-experimental debriefing talk.6 We first hear the experimenter – off-
screen – starting the debriefing interview, but after a little rupture in the 
footage, another person takes over, judging from the voice it is Stanley 
Milgram himself who intervenes: one is tempted to say because of the fact 
that Pozi must have seemed to Milgram such a good example of the 
experiment’s aim7. 
 
Milgram.: I’d like to ask you a few questions if I may – How do you 
feel? 
Pozi: I feel alright, but I don’t like what happened to that fellow in 
there, he’s been hollering. We had to keep giving him shocks, I don’t 
like that one bit. I mean, he wanted to get out, and he just kept going, 
keep throwing 450 Volts, I don’t like that, he won’t even look at that 
gentlemen. 
Milgram: But who was actually pushing the switch?8 
 
The first question immediately reveals what the experiment is about, the 
question how do you feel is revealing that the experiment indeed does not 
want to analyse but rather wants to psychologize the whole issue of 
obedience. Milgram’s questions ‘do you feel upset?’, or ‘what did you feel 
then?’ in the meantime have become the standard phrases of emo-television. 
The fragment furthermore shows that Milgram refuses any explanation of 
the subject blaming the situation. Milgram individualizes the scene: who 
was actually pushing the switch? So paradoxically, while Milgram’s 
 
6 This debriefing moment did not always gave a full disclosure of the deception, as 
Milgram’s assistant Allan C. Elms contends, Milgram wanted to maintain the deception of 
most participants until most of his series of experiments were done (Elms, 2009). 
Nevertheless in his book of 1974 Milgram clearly presents the disclosure of the deception 
during the debriefing as the most pure form of his experiment. Although it is also an 
argument to counter critiques on the ethics of the experiment, Milgram is drawing most of 
his conclusions from instances where this kind of debriefing was the case. In our opinion it 
is only in this version that the paradigm of Milgram becomes full blown.  
7 Although Milgram claims that the experiment is highly standardized, it becomes clear in 
the film that sometimes it is the experimenter and other times Milgram himself who 
conducts the debriefing interview.  
8 This transcript of the Pozi session in the movie Obedience (Milgram, 1965b) and all the 
subsequent ones in this section are mine. 
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experiment wanted to show how obedience to authority is situational, the 
landing point of the experiment is the individual, or more exactly the 
psychology of the individual:  
 
Milgram: Why didn’t you just stop? 
Pozi: He won’t let me! I wanted to stop! I kept insisting to stop but he 
says no. I told him to look into the fellow, but he wouldn’t do it. 
Milgram: Is there anything that Mister Wallace in there could have 
said that would have gotten you to stop? 
 
Milgram repeats this question up to three times, as if Pozi fails to give 
Milgram the right answer: and would not that answer have been something 
psychologizing, mentioning a tension between Mr. Wallace’s hollerings and 
the commands of the experimenter, the juxtaposition around which the 
experiment was set up? As Pozi keeps on missing this hint Milgram cuts 
things short:  
 
Milgram: Why didn’t you stop anyway? 
Pozi: I did stop, but he (the experimenter) [insisted] keep going, keep 
going! 
Milgram: But why didn’t you just disregard what he said? 
Pozi: He said it is got to go on, the experiment! 
Milgram: Okay, I’d like to tell you a little bit about the experiment… do 
you feel a little upset? [my emphasis] 
 
Milgram then discloses the set-up of the experiment saying that the learner 
was not getting shocks and was only part of the act: “so why don’t we bring 
in Mr. Wallace”, says Milgram. And there we find ourselves in a typical 
psychotainment-show scene: the grand finale with its discharging of 
emotions. Milgram interrupts the reconciliation between Mr. Wallace and 
Pozi just one more time: “Now that you know (…), how do you feel (…).” 
If the Milgram experiment is an enactment, then it is essentially about 
psychologizing: an intersubjective situation is set up in order to individualize 
and psychologize it. Milgram’s de-briefing restores to the unified subject of 
psychology its wholeness and synthesis, its autonomy and its self-
consciousness, which for Lacan are the ultimate illusions cherished by 
psychology (Lacan, 1966: 832). For Lacan psychology is a powerful tool of 
“technocratic exploitation” (Lacan, 1966: 851) and this is illustrated by 
Milgram: his ingenious and forceful experimental design ends up with the 
coercive imposition of the discourse of emotions. The psychologizing how do 
you feel envisions the unification of the Lacanian barred subject. Is this not 
already an answer to the question why serious psychologists are that eager 
to whisk Milgram away? It holds some truth about their discipline and 
about the place of it in contemporary society: it betrays in an all too simple 
way that the business of mainstream psychology boils down to a 
psychologization process. Psychology brings not the analysis, in that way it 
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is not a science, it is the praxis of psychologizing. In the film we see this in 
full action:  
 
Milgram: How do you feel? 
Subject X: How do I feel? He was getting the shocks, I’m doing all 
right. 
Milgram: How do you feel about Mr. Williams? 
Subject X: I don’t know, never gave it a thought. You mean I didn’t like 
him? 
Milgram: No, eh, well how did you feel about him? 
 
This person, seemingly not yet acquainted with the individualizing 
psychological discourse, still needs to be introduced by Milgram into the 
psychological self-assessment with which we are so acquainted. Milgram’s 
social engineering is thus a self-enactment: the experiment is about how 
(social) psychology realizes its paradigms through the imposing of the 
academic, psychological gaze. Psychologization is about the psy-sciences 
legitimating their position in the movement of self-dramatization.  
 
Obedience to psychology 
 
Milgram writes that in order to study obedience he chose science to stand 
for authority, suggesting it could also have been the military, the church or 
the educational system (Milgram, 1974: 142). He thus not only downplays 
the central role of science in his experiment, he also masks the fact that it is 
the authority of the psy-sciences which he brings into play. The whole 
outset is marked by, in psychoanalytical terms, a transferential context 
unrecognized or unquestioned by Milgram itself. While however, psychology 
as a signifier enters the script from the very start: “I should like to tell both 
of you something about The Memory Project”, thus the experimenter starts 
his introduction:  
 
Psychologists have developed several theories to explain how people 
learn various types of material. Some of the better-known theories are 
treated in that book over there, The Teaching Learning Process by 
Cantor (Milgram, 1965b). 
 
Science, and more specifically psychology, is the frame of the experiment. 
The fact that the participants are shown the Cantor book displayed on a 
stand, as we see in Milgram’s movie (Milgram, 1965b), indicates that 
psychology is the master-signifier of the experiment, serving as a quilting 
point (‘point de capiton’, Lacan, 1966) structuring the whole setting. 
Psychology is thus explicitly present, on a stand, without being made 
explicit by Milgram. After showing the Cantor book, the experimenter 
continues to explain the theory of the role of punishment in the learning 
process and describes the aim of the experiment as wanting to find out more 
about that. This short introduction on behaviouristic learning psychology is 
De Vos, J. (2009) ‘Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment 
and Psychologization’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, pp. 223-246 
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm 
 
 
229 
 
                                                
followed by the rigged drawing, supposedly to decide who will be the teacher 
and who the learner. Many critics have observed the illogicality of this, as 
Orne and Holland put it:  
 
[T]he investigator presumably is interested in determining how the 
victim’s rate of learning is affected by punishment, yet there is nothing 
that he requires of the S (teacher) that he could not as easily do 
himself (Orne & Holland, 1968: 287). 
 
Also Brannigan remarks that the credibility of the experiment is not 
furthered by the fact the teaching could obviously be carried out without 
volunteer teachers (Brannigan, 2004: 55). But stressing the incredibility, do 
these commentators not miss – together with Milgram himself – what this 
role assignment essentially is about? What Lacanian discourse theory 
teaches us is that we have to look for the subject positions in a particular 
organization of a discourse (Parker, 2005) And here Milgram’s experiment is 
very clear: assigning the subject as the teacher actually turns the layman 
into an experimental learning scientist: the role assigned is the role of 
psychologist! Maybe this is also why the subjects so easily and uncritically 
submit to the role assignment: because they are very familiar with it. For in 
processes of psychologization the so-called layman invariably is turned into 
a proto-psychologist: he is called upon to look at himself through an 
academic and psychologizing gaze: he is to become his own psychologist. 
How do you feel?, Milgram’s basic post-experimental question, exactly 
induces this way of looking upon oneself from the perspective of psychology. 
Milgram, introducing the experiment to the subjects, keeps his reference to 
learning psychology brief and basic because he presupposes a widespread 
familiarity with these psychological theories. It is furthermore crucial to see 
that the role of the proto-psychologist is essentially that of an apprentice, of 
a student: the psychologization discourse is an educational discourse9. We 
must understand Milgram’s experiment as a basically didactic experiment 
where the subject plays the role of psychologist to be consequently debriefed 
in order to take up the role of student in the psy-sciences. Not surprisingly 
Milgram, as the real Teacher of the experiment, has his favourite students. 
Mr. Braverman is one of them, as he clearly differs from Fred Pozi or the 
man we have called subject X who can be seen as the prototypes of the pre-
Milgram era, the ones still not fully immersed in the psychologization 
discourse. Milgram writes about Mr. Braverman: 
 
9 When Stam et al. question the transfer of Milgram’s research results on the argument 
that the set-up of the experiment as a “teaching” and “learning” exercise is natural to an 
educational context but not to the historical examples of obedience Milgram wishes to 
address (Stam et al., 1998: 161) – then one could ask if the psycho-educational context is 
not more widespread then Stam et al. think. Milgram’s choice to use the scientific 
framework, and especially psychological research as such, as the background for his agent 
of authority is not fortuitous. Academization and psychologization are but facets of 
modernity coming to full blossom in the 20th century, and it would be interesting, but 
beyond the scope of this paper, to reread the historical examples of obedience in this light. 
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In the interview, Mr. Braverman summarizes the experiment with 
impressive fluency and intelligence. He feels the experiment may have 
been designed also to “test the effects on the teacher of being in an 
essentially sadistic role, as well as the reactions of a student to a 
learning situation that was authoritative, rigid and punitive” (Milgram, 
1974: 53). 
 
The experiment thus has the structure of the process of psychologization. 
Braverman becomes the scientist-apprentice adopting a scientific and 
psychologizing view on his own behavior and thoughts. As the experimenter 
asks the typical psychologizing questions, Braverman does not fail to answer 
him in the expected format: 
 
 Experimenter: At what point were you most tense or nervous? 
Braverman: Well, when he first began to cry out in pain, and I realized 
this was hurting him. This got worse when he just blocked and 
refused to answer. There was I. I'm a nice person, I think, hurting 
somebody, and caught up in what seemed a mad situation . . . and in 
the interest of science, one goes through with it (Milgram, 1974: 53-
54). 
 
Here we see why Lacan critiqued the American Ego-Analysis and other 
forms of psychotherapy: they lead to an identification with the analyst or 
psychotherapist (Lacan, 1966). Milgram shows on top of this that this 
identification is essentially about identifying with the position of the 
psychologist and his outlook, his gaze, on the world. There was I, says 
Braverman: this is the gaze of psychology in action. It is not surprising that 
in a questionnaire one year after the experiment Braverman fully engages in 
the psycho-babble: 
 
What appalled me was that I could possess this capacity for obedience 
and compliance to a central idea, i.e., the value of a memory 
experiment even after it became clear that adherence to this value was 
at the expense of violation of another value, i.e., don't hurt someone 
who is helpless and not hurting you. As my wife said, ‘You can call 
yourself Eichmann’, I hope I deal more effectively with any future 
conflicts of values I encounter (Milgram, 1974: 54). 
 
Here the didactical objectives of the experiment lie at the surface. Milgram’s 
experiment is about teaching his subjects a lesson. The post-experimental 
question “What in your opinion is the most effective way of strengthening 
resistance to inhumane authority?” (Milgram, 1974: 52) calls the subject 
into the psychology class. But the specificity of psychologization is that once 
you call subjects into the classroom, you cannot simply send them back to 
outside naive life again: having adopted a reflexive view, there is no way 
back. The draft into psychology hails the subject irreversibly into the ranks 
of the (proto)psychologists.  
De Vos, J. (2009) ‘Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment 
and Psychologization’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, pp. 223-246 
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm 
 
 
231 
 
The Milgram experiment shows how the theory and the praxis of 
psychology is caught up in what Lacan calls the university discourse: in 
which the subject claims presence in being a subject and in its mastery of 
itself and the universe (Lacan, 1998, 56). Once the subject is seduced into 
the university discourse, he claims to be himself part of those supposed to 
know. As one of Milgram’s subjects put it: 
 
Although I am … employed in engineering, I have become convinced 
that the social sciences and especially psychology, are much 
important in today’s world” (Milgram, 1974: 52)  
 
Milgram reports that a large number of subjects spontaneously requested to 
be used (sic) in further experimentation (Milgram, 1965a: 58). He considers 
the didactic effects as a central positive outcome of the experiment and he 
writes that the subjects on the whole viewed the experiment as an 
opportunity to learn something of importance about themselves, and about 
the conditions of human action (Milgram, 1974: 196). But has this approach 
not always been a strong current in social psychology? A good example of 
this position is Baron and Byrne’s claim that there is growing evidence that 
“when individuals learn about the findings of social psychological research, 
they may change their behaviour to take account of this knowledge” (Baron 
and Byrne, 1994: 384). The objective of the psy-sciences is the mastery of 
the subject of itself and the universe. A kind of enhanced and improved 
meta-behaviour informed by science is considered possible. But as we see 
that Milgram’s subjects, in their assigned role as experimental social 
scientists, seem to disregard all the evident clues of deception, does this not 
illustrate the psychoanalytical idea that the university discourse ultimately 
is driven by a “passion for ignorance”, a desire not to know (Lacan, 1998: 
121)? And here Milgram’s subjects seems to share something with Milgram 
himself: for Milgram himself seems to be completely blind to the fact that the 
use of the theoretical framework of psychology as his figure of authority 
leads to quite dazzling looping effects. Or as David Corfield puts it: what 
passes unspoken in the experiment is Milgram’s relation to the scientific 
imperative (Corfield, 2002: 199). Let us go deeper into that in the next 
section.  
 
Obedience to science 
 
While the mainstream critique is that Milgram deceived his test-subjects in 
an all too obvious way, this cannot really account for the fact that Milgram’s 
subjects seem to disregard the manifold clues. Milgram’s commentators 
disregard or misinterpret this desire not to know because they fail to 
understand that this exactly pertains to the core of obedience. Take for 
example Orne and Holland (1968), one of the earliest influential critiques. 
Criticizing Milgram’s use of deception, they argue that while probably many 
of Milgram’s subjects had figured it out, they nevertheless went through 
with the experiment because of a kind of a pact of ignorance: they continued 
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in order not to jeopardize the experiment. Moreover, as they write, many of 
the subjects might have acted on the idea that, being in a scientific setting, 
it had been taken care off that no real damage or hurt would come to 
anyone (Orne and Holland, 1968). Downplaying the experiment as scientistic 
they want to rescue the idea of a scientific based (social) psychology which 
would not merely be a self-enactment or self-dramatization. What they miss 
together with Milgram is how the science of psychology is inextricably bound 
to the dynamics of psychologization. For what Orne and Holland fail to see is 
that their critique exactly shows how obedience enters the very heart of 
Milgram’s experiment. The so called pact of ignorance shows again the 
compliance, the obedience as such, which is as far as we know much higher 
then the 65% of obedience Milgram found. In the perspective of Orne and 
Holland, 100% of the subjects complied, for there are no reports of subjects 
who denounced the experiment as fake right from the start: everybody 
seems to have accepted to be part of Milgram’s amateur dramatics. 
Is there anything more powerful then faked obedience? Let us 
illustrate this with a little anecdote of an adolescent girl attending a 
hypnotist show. The hypnotist asks the audience to clasp their hands 
together as hard as they can, he predicts that their hands will stay together 
when they are asked to release the pressure. But as the experiment does not 
work out, he quickly asks if anyone at least felt some counter-pressure 
(which is of course perfectly understandable as the effect of muscular 
tension). The girl shyly raises her hand and much to her dislike in being 
picked out as a volunteer, she does not dare to refuse. The hypnotist asks 
her to close her eyes, he is going to bring her into hypnosis and make her 
body so rigid that it can be stretched like a plank between two chairs. While 
she thinks the hypnosis is not working, she decides to play the part and 
tries to hold her body as stiff as possible as she is being laid on two chairs. 
Afterwards her friends tell her that it was really amazing, although, judging 
from the pictures from the digital camera, she herself does not find the 
curve of her body very impressive. Is this not an example of how faked 
obedience can be quite powerful? In this instance the desire not to know 
assumes the form of (fetishist) disavowal: I know very well… but nevertheless 
(Mannoni, 1969) which is a powerful stance in social dynamics. For 
example, a leader is maybe better off with faked obedience, with 
subordinates who amongst peers critique their leader and in the back of 
their minds reserve a private personal space. What critics such as Orne and 
Holland miss is that faked obedience might thus be stronger then so called 
blind obedience. Just think about the compliance of employees to cooperate 
with the role games and team building activities set up by the Human 
Resource Management (HRM) department however infantile and humiliating 
they are. Faked compliance is the compliance able to rise to the 100% level. 
However when one searches for 100% obedience, the Milgram 
experiment still offers a much simpler instance. Milgram got 100% 
obedience from his confederates, especially from the so-called experimenter 
who was to prompt the naïve subject to go on. That role was played by John 
Williams, a 31-year-old high school biology teacher who had a set of 
De Vos, J. (2009) ‘Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment 
and Psychologization’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, pp. 223-246 
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm 
 
 
233 
 
                                                
prompts he had to use when the subject protested or hesitated to administer 
the shocks. However much the subjects were in distress, asking to be 
allowed to stop, begging him to look in to the poor victim, Williams remained 
unmoved and, fully complying with his assigned role, he carried on with the 
experiment10. But of course we cannot stop with Milgram as the last 
authority, we have to ask the question to whom is he answering, to whom is 
he obeying. There the answer is, as we have already suggested in our 
introduction, he is obeying (or faking to obey, remember his rewriting of his 
original article) science. In this respect David Corfield compares Milgram 
with the Abraham figure, the one required to inflict senseless pain, in this 
case not on his own son but on 1000 men from Bridgeport and New Haven: 
 
So, if Milgram is Abraham and the subject is Isaac, then what plays 
the role of God? The only answer to this question is science itself. 
Obedience to God’s command outweighs such aesthetic considerations 
as the pleasure gained from his child and such ethical considerations 
as that of putting his son’s life before his own […] (Corfield, 2002: 198) 
 
It is only from the perspective of the theme of obedience to science – in 
which all the parties in the experiment up to Milgram himself are caught – 
that we can understand the fundamental theatricality of the experiment. 
The fact that the so called naïve subjects are put in the role of experimental 
psychologists entails that the setting of the drama cannot be overlooked: we 
are in the midst of Academia. Moreover, Milgram is fully aware that he has 
set up the scene departing from a scenario featuring Science. He 
understands that he obtains obedience with academic currency: he writes 
that it is the idea of science and its acceptance which “provide the 
overarching ideological justification for the experiment” (Milgram, 1974: 
142). Yannis Stavrakakis even reads a proto-lacanian formulation in 
Milgram’s assessment on the source in authority: when Milgram writes that 
the subject enters the situation with the expectation that someone will be in 
charge and that the experimenter “fills a gap experienced by the subject”, 
Stavrakakis recognizes there Lacan’s formula of fantasy (Stavrakakis, 2007: 
175). This fantasmatic frame that supports the symbolic command and 
binds the subject to the elementary structure of obedience is for Stavrakakis 
science itself (Stavrakakis, 2007: 175). But is it not strange that where 
Milgram is fully aware of the power effects of science, he nevertheless fails to 
assess his own position and fails to take into account the looping effects of 
obedience in his experiment? This is the disavowed tautology in Milgram: his 
experiment is science studying the power effects of science. That is where 
 
10 In this light, G.A. Shelton conducted an interesting variant of Milgram’s experiment: she 
put her subject in the role of the experimenter having to oversee the teacher, who actually 
was also a confederate. She had 22 out of the 24 subjects continuing to the end despite the 
teacher - as shock levels increased - becoming more and more anxious, i.e. she “expressed 
uneasiness, then became quite anxious, angry, on the verge of tears; cursed, complained of 
stomach pains, asked for a glass of water, and pleaded with the experimenter to stop the 
session..” (cited in Blass, 2000: 52-53) 
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his experiment becomes a blind acting out, a mere enactment of the 
fantasmatic frame of science. It is exactly there, at the blind spot of the 
fantasy, that the paradoxes and the looping effects arise and thus the power 
effects of science become clear, not as an analysis, but as an acting out. For 
in the end, Milgram’s main move is the psychologizing post-experimental 
debriefing: the powerful imposing of the psychological gaze: now that you 
know, how do you feel? To go one step further, the inevitably blind spot of 
science which characterizes and structures the powerful university discourse 
(according to Lacan the dominating discourse in late-capitalist society), is 
the place where the psy-sciences come in: functioning as a tautological 
keystone. For, the Milgram experiment is not only an experiment of 
obedience to authority and to science, but it shows us that we have come to 
the point where we cannot but understand obedience from the framework of 
psychology.  
 What then is the result of being subjected to this university discourse? 
Žižek warns us to avoid the Foucauldian misreading:  
 
… the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises as 
the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but its 
remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power. (Žižek, 
2005: 139-140) 
 
The subject does not simply stand for the result of the discursive operation, 
but rather for its indivisible remainder, the excess which resists being 
included in the discursive network (Žižek, 2005: 140). The subject is thus 
not the sum of the objectivations of bio-science: man is exactly the fall-out 
of the encroaching of science on his Lebenswelt. We can say then that since 
the Enlightenment, subjectivity is the name of this problematic aspect of 
modernity. Therefore the subject is both the main problem and often the 
unwanted guest of the sciences, the one who spoils it all. Psychology then 
claims to take care of this problematic subject: psychology aspires to be the 
meta-theory of all the sciences, taking care of the breaches subjectivity 
causes in the constructions of science. What Milgram and (with him) 
mainstream psychology neglect is that the subject they want to approach 
with their science, is already a product of Enlightenment, of modernity, of 
science. In this way Milgram’s experiment cannot be a re-enactment of the 
modern process of subjectivation: it produces a subject baffled, humiliated 
and reduced to the scientific analysis which was scripted into the entire 
experiment itself. In this way, Milgram’s experiment is the acting-out of the 
psychologization processes enclosed in the project of modernity – and this, 
as we will probe in the last step of our critical engagement with Milgram’s 
experiment, is connected with something one is tempted the call a perverse 
core in psychology. 
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The obscene surplus of obedience 
 
Milgrams stance of now that you know is a clear instance of Lacan’s 
conception of a two-body psychology. The ‘you’ of now that you know, is the 
unified psychological subject (as we have called it earlier) addressed by the 
person (this is the second body) of the psychologist. Both constitute the 
parties of a two body-psychology which for Lacan boils down to  
 
… the relation of two bodies between which is established a 
fantasmatic communication in which the analyst teaches the subject 
to apprehend himself as an object; subjectivity is admitted into it only 
within the parentheses of the illusion, and speech is placed on the 
index of a search for the lived experience that becomes its supreme 
aim, but the dialectically necessary result appears in the fact that, 
since the subjectivity of the analyst is free from all restraint, his 
subjectivity leaves the subject at the mercy of every summons of his 
[the analyst’s] speech (Lacan, 1966: 304-305, English translation: 
Lacan, 2001: 67) 
 
Milgram’s now that you know, how do you feel teaches the subject to look 
upon himself as an object : the you of how do you feel is the searched for 
illusionary lived experience which alienates the subject under the coercive 
objectifying stance of the expert. If then Lacan argues that such an 
approach cannot but lead to the identification of the subject with the 
psychologist, this is clearly illustrated with Milgram: the subject asked to 
look upon himself as the object of his feelings, is thus compelled to identify 
with the psychologist’s gaze. Furthermore, “the being at the mercy of every 
summons” of the expert reveals something of the latter’s whimsical power. 
For Lacan, the appeal to look upon oneself as an object, the appeal of the 
reality function, is clearly connected to the obscene, ferocious figure of the 
superego (Owens, 2008). And is this dimension not clearly traceable in 
Milgram’s experiment? 
For, looking at the film one for example cannot but be struck by the 
monotone and technical way the experimenter Williams prompts the subject 
to go on: featureless and without emotions he repeats his standard phrases. 
It is quite obvious, Milgram looking for obedient torturers, had already 
scripted one into the experiment. It made Bruno Bettelheim remark that 
Milgram’s work was “so vile that nothing his experiments show has any 
value” and that they were in line with the human experiments of the Nazis 
(cited in Parker*, 2000: 116). And does this not seem to be the case, and 
does thus not something of the dimension of the obscene, ferocious figure of 
the superego becomes present in Milgram’s experiment? While Milgram 
dismisses the Freudian explanation of aggression and destructive tendencies 
playing a role in his obedience experiment (Milgram, 1974: 165), these 
tendencies seems to re-emerge at the site of the experimenter and his 
merciless treatment of the test-subjects. Just think of what Milgram 
considers as experimental evidence against the Freudian thesis: in variation 
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11 of the experiment the subjects were free to use any shock level they 
wished, and it turned out they only used low-levels of shocks, even while 
“the experimenter took pains to legitimize the use of all levers on the board” 
(Milgram, 1974: 166). Is not that expression, ‘of taking pains’, pointing to 
the fact that sadomasochistic tendencies were still haunting the experiment, 
be it on the side of Milgram and his confederates? Also Stam et al. argue 
that the use of deception as a means for extracting the truth, departing from 
the premise that people are simply not honest, “bears some resemblance to 
the topos of torturers who express regret for having to deal with the victim’s 
obstinacy” (Stam et al., 1998: 169). 
What is meant to be researched becomes exactly the blind spot of the 
experiment: not only is obedience being blindly enacted, but also an obscene 
surplus becomes visible. As Dannie Abse suggested: if Milgram was looking 
for little Eichmanns11 then “the experimenter had to act the part, to some 
extent, of a Himmler”(cited in Brannigan, 2004: 58). But if we read the 
experiment to the letter, then it is only in their assigned role as experimental 
psychologists, that the subjects are turned into torturers: to be topped by 
the experimenter who becomes the torturer of them all. So the question is, 
what is Milgram’s role? Is he not the one who in the end at the Candid 
Camera12 moment of disclosure, comes to recollect what in psychoanalysis 
is called the surplus-value, the surplus jouissance?13 The Candid Camera 
moment of disclosing the situation is the moment where the implicit script 
becomes the explanation and the analysis of the whole situation. This is of 
course how role-playing games used in educational, HRM or even 
psychotherapeutic settings, are set up: you play and enact a pre-scripted 
situation after which the script itself is revealed as the analysis. In the 
Milgram experiment, the revelation moment is so to speak capitalised on 
several levels: not only are the participants subjected to it, but so too are the 
viewers of Milgram’s documentary “Obedience” (Milgram, 1965b): only after a 
good time has elapsed do the viewers learn the real set-up of the experiment. 
This technique is often repeated in papers, textbooks and T.V.-
documentaries on Milgram: up to and including in the auditoria, the 
experiment is usually introduced without disclosing the deception, so that 
after having asked the question what would YOU do? the lecturer proceeds 
to the moment of revelation-humiliation and the further scientific 
 
11 Although Milgram himself in a way knew this: as he noted that urging his staff to keep up 
the supply of experimental volunteers, echoed Eichman’s task to organize the transport of 
the Jews to the death camps (see Parker, 2002: 114). 
12 Ian Parker writes that Milgram was a great admirer of Candid Camera, which became a 
network hit in 1960 (Parker, 2002: 103). 
13 Lacan’s concept of surplus-jouissance (surplus-enjoyment) refers to the Marxist 
conception of surplus-value. For Lacan the university discourse resembles the discourse of 
the capitalist; where the wealthy acquire knowledge on top of everything else, as Lacan puts 
it: they don’t pay for it (Lacan, 1991: 95). Isn’t this the position that Milgram takes? 
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détumesence: now that you know, how do you feel?14 That is the moment of 
the recollection and the capitalisation of the surplus-jouissance.  
What gets obliterated here is the position from where the question and 
what would you do? is asked: who is the enunciator of that question? It 
seems that the concept of the agentic state, Milgram’s attempt to theorise 
his findings, foremost describes the position of the social scientist himself: 
 
… the person entering an authority system no longer views himself as 
acting out of his own purposes but rather comes to see himself as an 
agent for executing the wishes of another person (Milgram, 1974: 133). 
 
This is also true of the experimenter and Milgram themselves. Milgram, from 
a meta-human, meta-subjective position, assumes the task as the mere 
servant of science to… humiliate the subjects. Psychoanalytically, this 
reducing oneself to an instrument of science, is strictly homologous to the 
position of the pervert. As Lacan states, the pervert is occupying the place of 
the object for the benefit of another, “for whose jouissance he exercises his 
action as sadistic pervert” (Lacan, 1978: 135): it is not my will nor 
responsibility to bring all this obscenity to light, I am merely an instrument 
of science. The whole Milgram experiment is set up to lead to the moment of 
disclosure, the lifting of the veils to reveal the subject’s supposed true 
nature and this moment of humiliation serves the constitution of the pervert 
agent of science as it exerts its power over its victims, the naïve subjects. Put 
bluntly: the lesson of psychology is the power of psychology. Milgram’s 
experiment is meant to dazzle the test subject and the broad public with the 
power of science to lay bare the human condition: might you not have gone 
to the 450V level as 65% of the people do? That is the humiliation Milgram 
had us awaiting, degrading us to screens onto which the knowledge of 
psychology is projected. Now that you know, how do you feel then is the 
ultimate Anrufung15 forcefully drawing the subject into the discourse of 
psychology. Milgram shows how the psy-sciences are able to reach full 
compliance: enforcing introspection it promises us redemption letting us 
believe that salvation exactly lies in science. The subjects of psychologization 
are promised access to the surplus jouissance of Knowledge.  
The Milgram experience shows how psychology in this way, exactly 
through its own enactment, is a very powerful discourse. And here we have 
to broaden the perspective: the humble and sacrificial obedience to science 
leads to the obedience to power in general. In other words: Milgram’s 
enactment of the power of social psychology, prepares us for the power of 
today’s hegemonic discourses, or as Stam et al. put it very concisely: 
 
 
14 The humiliating aspect of the Milgram experiment was quite quickly criticized by for 
example Diane Baumrind, dealing however with this issue from the narrow perspective of 
the ethics of experiments with human beings (Baumrind, 1964). 
15 Interpellation is Althusser's term to describe a mechanism whereby the human subject 
is ‘constituted’ (constructed) by pre-given structures. 
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The evidence then becomes a reason for accepting the authority of 
social psychology as knowledge about the conflicts in our lives. The 
Milgram studies show the correctness of the American position as a 
nation, as a middle class, and as people on the “side of freedom and 
decency” (Stam et al., 1998: 173). 
 
It is clear, nothing much emancipatory is to expected from the Milgram 
experiment. Just consider what the already mentioned Doris Lessing wrote: 
  
Imagine us saying to children: "In the last fifty or so years, the human 
race has become aware of a great deal of information about its 
mechanisms; how it behaves, how it must behave under certain 
circumstances. If this is to be useful, you must learn to contemplate 
these roles calmly, dispassionately, disinterestedly, without emotion. 
It is information that will set people free from blind loyalties, 
obedience to slogans, rhetoric, leaders, group emotions” (Lessing, 
1986: 60). 
 
Well there it is, in all its bluntness: let us use social psychology to produce 
calm, dispassionate, disinterested, emotionless, and thus obedient persons.  
 
Conclusions on disobedience 
 
Milgram understands disobedience as the expression of the fact that 
transformation to the agentic state for some subjects is only partial: 
 
Residues of selfhood, remaining in varying degrees outside the 
experimenter’s authority, keep personal values alive in the subject and 
lead to strain, which, if sufficiently powerful, can result in 
disobedience (Milgram, 1974: 155). 
 
The residues of the person behind the clerk, behind the bureaucrat, behind 
the scientist – we’re back on the landing strip of individual psychology – is 
where according to Milgram the grains of disobedience are to be found. 
Drawing upon Slavoj Žižek however, one can argue exactly the opposite: 
these personal residues are what make the call for obedience work: 
 
… an ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely when 
we maintain an awareness that we are not fully identical to it, that 
there is a rich human person beneath it: ‘not all is ideology, beneath 
the ideological mask, I am also a human person’ is the very form of 
ideology, of its ‘practical efficiency’ (Žižek, 1997: 21). 
 
The person who identifies totally with the system even renouncing the whole 
of his/her selfhood is dangerous for authority. Žižek gives the example of the 
soldier in the Vietnam movie Full Metal Jacket who over-identifies with the 
military ideological machine: totally immersed, he loses his mind and shoots 
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both the drill-sergeant and himself (Žižek, 1997: 21). The real functionally 
obedient soldier is the one who keeps a critical distance: fostering his 
residues of selfhood, in the end he always complies. In Žižek’s example it is 
the soldier who writes ‘born to kill’ next to a peace sign on his helmet who 
eventually turns out to be the reliable military subject (Žižek, 1997: 21). Is 
the image not well known of the German Nazis in the death camps retreating 
for the night in their private quarters to converse, listen to music and to 
read Goethe?  
The psychologised disobedience celebrated by Milgram is ambiguous 
still from another viewpoint. Because, while it appears that Milgram 
promotes dissent from authority or from the hegemonic discourses, he 
eventually only promotes a saying no to malevolent authority, to the bad dr. 
No. This presupposes that the subject will still say yes to good science, just 
and democratic society, and honest law and order: in other words, to the 
American way of Life. Milgram’s message is but a say no to dr. No! Also Stam 
et al. come to this conclusion, writing that Milgram boils down to a sanitized 
message to disobey “destructive authority” without ever naming that 
authority or pointing to the effects of that authority in our world other than 
through distant historical analogy (Stam et al., 1998: 176).  
Does this sanitizing not culminate in the Candid Camera moment of 
disclosing the deception? There the Milgram experiment becomes full blown: 
instead of the intended re-humanization, this moment of psychologization is 
humiliating and de-subjectivating: now that you know, how do you feel – 
please indicate on a scale. If there is one moment in the experiment which is 
thus structured as to make almost impossible any disobedience, it is here. 
Disobedience here would be the refusal of the scripted reconciliation and the 
coercive psychologization of the experience: what should be rejected is the 
therapeutic administered sympathy, the carefully planned draining of 
emotions and the further theoretizations. 
 Milgram’s experiment, in it didactic objectives, beholds the fantasy of 
the scientific informed hero who would be able to withstand malevolent 
authority and perform some enlightened act of resistance. Having loathed 
those who obey while comforting themselves on account of their disobedient 
thoughts, claiming thus to be on the side of the angels (Milgram, 1974: 10), 
Milgram sees the real angels as those enlightened by science. But where 
does this situate Milgram himself if not above the angels and the devils as 
well? Milgram assumes what Lacan calls the place of the Other of the 
Other16. And this furthermore seems to have a decisive effect on the 
relationship of the subject vis-à-vis his equal, for Milgram writes about a 
particular subject: 
  
What is extraordinary is his apparent total indifference to the learner; 
he hardly takes cognizance of him as a human being. Meanwhile, he 
 
16 Zizek defines the Lacanian notion of “The Other of the Other” as the meta-guarantee of 
the consistency of the symbolic order that regulates social life (the big Other) (Zizek, 2000: 
362). 
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relates to the experimenter in a submissive and courteous fashion 
[…](Milgram, 1974: 48). 
 
So for Milgram, morality does not disappear: 
 
Instead, it acquires a radically different focus. He does not respond 
with a moral sentiment to the actions he performs. Rather, his moral 
concern now shifts to a consideration of how well he is living up to the 
expectations that the authority has of him (Milgram, 1974: 8). 
 
Milgram’s experiment thus empties the relation of a subject with his fellow 
man of any human qualities. The effect of the authority of science is that the 
locus of humanity shifts to the transferential relation of the subject with the 
scientist or science in general. That is where Milgram keeps his subjects 
imprisoned and there the coerciveness of the experiment becomes total. For 
at the debriefing the equal turns out to be nothing more then an actor, a 
prop on the stage. The only substantial and meaningful relation at the end 
is the one between the subject and Milgram, the representative of the 
powerful psy-sciences. Milgram’s experiment there is the enactment of the 
production of psychological man locked in his relation to Science. 
But do we here not have a similar logic with psychoanalysis? Is not 
the analytic setting the ultimate example of emptying the outer world? As 
the analysand engages in his soliloquy the others and the world as such 
become nothing more then the effects of solipsism. If Stam et al. write that 
in the Milgram experiment the “subjects’ bodies are first abstracted from 
their social context and then recontextualized in a way that denies their 
social constitution” (Stam et al, 1998: 161), then this critique also holds for 
psychoanalysis. Because, is not psychoanalysis, as Žižek puts it, the 
ultimate method of humiliation? 
 
… is not the very aim of the psychoanalytic process to shake the 
foundations of the analysand's fundamental fantasy, i.e., to bring 
about the "subjective destitution" by which the subject acquires a sort 
of distance toward his fundamental fantasy as the last support of his 
(symbolic) reality? Is not the psychoanalytic process itself, then, a 
refined and therefore all the more cruel method of humiliation, of 
removing the very ground beneath the subject's feet, of forcing him to 
experience the utter nullity of those "divine details" around which all 
his enjoyment is crystallized? (Žižek, 1991: 156)  
 
Of course the crucial point is that psychoanalysis does not, as psychology 
does, envision a subsequent restitution of man as a psychological being: in 
contrast to psychology, psychoanalysis pretends not to be the cure to the 
experience of this subjective destitution, this zero-level of subjectivity17. 
 
17 Psychoanalysis in the Freudo-Lacanian tradition does not aim to supplement the zero-
level of subjectivity. On the contrary, so called post-Freudian Ego-psychoanalysis has been 
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Psychoanalysis in this way claims to be the very tool for deconstructing 
Academia. Psychoanalysis as the refusal of scientific humanism, the refusal 
of the closure of the system, can be a method to analyse how experiments 
like Milgram’s are not in any way subversive but on the contrary lead to 
conformity to the hegemonic discourses.  
 But, one could reply, what does psychoanalysis then offer? Is not 
psychoanalysis equally impotent in showing alternative ways of 
disobedience? For, is not Milgram’s celebration of the heroic act of 
disobedience not very close to what Žižek always seems to end up with, the 
romanticizing of the individual act? Ian Parker (the critical psychologist this 
time) for example criticizes Žižek’s romanticizing of resistance, while it 
reduces collective political action to individual heroic ‘acts’ (Parker I, 2004: 
97). This critique then returns almost literally in Parker’s assessment on 
Milgram: where Parker states that Milgram blocks the road to a valuation of 
the social: Milgram’s message is “the social is bad for you and others” 
(Parker, 2007: 85). But is not the social, together with subjectivity, a 
category that has become problematical and paradoxical since the 
Enlightenment? Both categories are invariably deconstructed and reduced to 
biological, evolutionary, psychological or social mechanisms. Academia is 
the total incorporation of the Lebenswelt, alienating both the subject as well 
as the social. In this way both the subject and the social have irrevocably 
lost any positive substance outside Academia. Regarding the social, just 
think of governmental programs backed up by Academia which for example 
claim to restore the social fabric by creating meeting spaces to provide 
chances for dialogue and encounter. The social there cannot but come in an 
academic version18.  
 So if psychoanalysis departs from both a zero-level of subjectivity, as a 
zero-level of society, the crucial point becomes then the position one takes 
vis-à-vis the university discourse. The mainstream psy-sciences embrace the 
university discourse unproblematically: claiming to be a full science, psy-
science promises reconciliation and academically informed ways to integrate 
both subjectivity and society. The paradox of this we see emerging with 
Milgram: puzzled with the Eichman figure, he says, let us study authority, 
take the authority of, let us say… science. This is problematic because 
Milgram himself claims to speak from within science, and secondly, this 
prevents him from seeing how science itself is implicated in modernity and 
its own deadlocks – of which the Holocaust might be one of the important 
manifestations. So at the end, the problem of modernity, which maybe 
comes to light especially in late-Modernity, is that Academia has itself 
become the stand-in for society, depicting a psychological man as the stand-
in for the subject. This is what psychoanalysis as a discourse which claims 
a place (partly) outside of Academia is able perhaps to critique. For 
 
exactly reproached by Lacan for aiming at the building up of strong, well-adapted Ego’s 
(Lacan, 1966). 
18 Even attempts to bypass academia like ‘action research’ cannot escape the academisation 
of everyday life: “be your own expert – be your own researcher” is of course nothing but a 
further inducing of the academic gaze. 
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psychoanalysis is not a discourse of knowledge, but a discourse of truth. So, 
if psychoanalysis wants to remain true to the cause of the Truth, it shall 
have to choose another place than Academia, maybe Theoria, as defined by 
Žižek could be an option.  
 
And, incidentally, this is also how the critique of ideology (whose 
Platonic origins one should unabashedly admit) functions: it 
endeavours to smash our ears (hypnotized by the ideology's siren 
song) so that we can start to hear with our eyes (in the mode of 
theoria) (Žižek, 2006: 224). 
 
So let us not be lured then by today’s supposed stringency of our ethical 
committees: because while Milgram would today not be allowed to conduct 
his experiments, we are getting his psychologizing/desubjectivation scheme 
back in manifold ways via the siren song of ‘psychotainment’. As Jenny 
Diski writes, these days nothing prevents similar ‘experiments’ (Big Brother, 
Castaway & Co) “being carried out repeatedly for our fascination and 
entertainment on reality TV shows” (Diski, 2004). Milgram’s experiment, as 
a mere demonstration leading to no understanding whatsoever, seems to be 
the mother of all psychotainment shows. We should therefore not 
understand psycho-reality-shows as plain or direct insights into the human 
condition, instead pretty much like the Milgram experiment, these fully 
scripted programmes are written with the psychology textbook on the lap 
(De Vos, 2005).  
 So the first lesson of our Theoria will be about – while at the business 
of zero-levels I might as well throw yet another one in – the zero-level-of-
psychology. For if psychologists complain that ethical research guidelines 
threaten to make psychology impossible, is not this fear for the end of 
psychology foremost a defensive reaction against a zero-level-of-psychology? 
If the already mentioned Arthur G. Miller acknowledges that there have been 
times when he has wondered, just for a moment, if the Milgram experiments 
perhaps mean nothing at all (cited in Parker*, 2000: 121) then we have to 
replace the signifier experiment by the signifier psychology: what today’s 
mainstream psychology has to contend with is this feeling that it perhaps 
means nothing at all. The problem with psychology however is that it keeps 
reinventing itself (pretty much like capitalism) there will always be people 
like Miller who, knowing that it actually means nothing at all, will still keep 
propagating it. 
 
Epilogue 
 
It is not until very recently that the Milgram experiment was replicated by 
Jerry Burger: even though almost using the same set-up he did manage to 
get past the so called Institutional Review Board (the ethical committee of 
universities in the USA). In order to get a green light Burger had to made the 
experiment stress and trauma-free. He did this in three ways: first by 
providing a thorough multi-faceted screening of the participants, second, by 
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making sure that the subjects understood that they could step out at any 
time of the experiment, and last, by calling the experiment invariably to a 
halt at the 150 V level. At that level, just as in the original Milgram 
experiment, the learner for the first time explicitly protests and asks to get 
released. Burger then assesses if the participant would continue or not and 
then stops the experiment. Departing from the statistics of Milgram’s 
results, Burger argues that of the people who are willing to continue past 
150V, 79 percent would go all the way to the end of the shock generator 
(Burger, 2009). George Miller, who is altogether sympathetic to this attempt 
to replicate Milgram, nevertheless remains sceptic, pointing to the fact that 
the Milgram experiment explicitly relied on the emotional stress and the 
inner conflicts which Burger tried to eliminate (Miller, 2009). And maybe 
Miller is right: you cannot take the sting out of the bee and expect that it 
will keep on flying: Milgram Lite (in the expression of Elms, 2009) does not 
work, the element of transgression is essential to Milgram’s experiment. 
Just consider what Brewster Smith contended about the Milgram 
experiment: 
 
For myself, I find it quite possible to justify a Milgram study, as a 
carefully weighed exception, an important study that raises serious 
ethical questions but can be undertaken with heavy ethical 
responsibility falling on the investigator’s shoulders. I wouldn’t do 
such a study, but I really respect Milgram’s right to have done it. 
(Brewster Smith in 1976, cited in Miller, 2009) 
  
Is this not strikingly similar, almost word-for-word, to discussions on the 
issue of torture: it is a dirty job, but sometimes someone has to do it?  
De Vos, J. (2009) ‘Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment 
and Psychologization’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, pp. 223-246 
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm 
 
 
244 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Baron, R.A. & Byrne, D. (1994). Social Psychology : Understanding Human 
Interaction. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Baumrind, D. (1964). Some Thoughts on Ethics of Research: After Reading 
Milgram's "Behavioral Study of Obedience". American Psychologist, 19: 421-
423. 
 
Blass, T. (2000) (Ed.). Obedience to authority: Current perspectives on the 
Milgram paradigm. New Jersey: Mahwah. 
 
Brannigan, A. (2004). The Rise and Fall of Social Psychology: The Use and 
Misuse of the Experimental Method. New Jersey: Aldine Transaction. 
 
Burger, J.M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today? 
American Psychologist, 64(1): 1-11. 
 
Corfield, D. (2002). From mathematics to psychology: Lacan's missed 
encounters. In: Lacan and science. Jason Glynos and Yannis Stavrakakis 
(eds), 179-206. 
 
De Vos, J. (2005). On Psychology and Other Symptoms. Journal for Lacanian 
Studies, 3 (2): 258–270. 
 
Diski, J. (2004). XXX · The Man who Shocked the World: The Life and 
Legacy of Stanley Milgram by Thomas Blass. London Review of Books, 26(22)  
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n22/disk01_.html. 
 
Elms, A.C. (2009). Obedience Lite, American Psychologist, 64(1): 32-36. 
 
Lacan, J. (1966). Écrits. Paris: Seuil. 
 
Lacan, J. (1978). The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Ed. J.-
A. Miller. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton. 
 
Lacan J. (1998). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore; On 
Feminine Sexuality and the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972–73. Text 
established by Jacques-Alain 
Miller. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton. 
 
Lacan J. (1991). Le séminaire, livre XVII: L’envers de la psychanalyse, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris : Seuil. 
 
Lacan, J. (2001). Ecrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: 
Routledge. 
De Vos, J. (2009) ‘Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment 
and Psychologization’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, pp. 223-246 
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm 
 
 
245 
 
 
Laermans, R. (2006). Het experimentele theater van Stanley Milgram. The 
Milgram Re-enactment -Rod Dickinson & Steve Rushton. In: Vanderbeeken 
R. (ed.) What are you doing? Essays over videokunst. Maastricht: Jan van 
Eyck Academie. 
 
Lasch, C. (1978). The culture of narcissism. New York: Norton. 
 
Lessing, D. (1986). Prisons We Choose to Live Inside. Montréal: CBC 
Enterprises. 
 
Mannoni, O. (1969) Je sais bien mais quand même. In : Clefs pour 
l’imaginaire ou l’autre scène. Paris: Le Seuil: 9-33. 
 
Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology 67: 371–378. 
 
Milgram, S. (1965a). Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to 
Authority. Human relations, 18(1): 57-. 
 
Milgram, S. (1965b). Obedience film. University Park , PA : Penn State Audio 
Visual Services [distributor]. 
 
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to Authority; An Experimental View. London: 
Tavistock 
 
Milgram, S. (1981). This Week’s Citation Classic. Current Contents. 9(March 
2, 1981): 114 
(http://www.garfield.library.upenn.edu/classics1981/A1981LC33300001.p
df. 
 
Miller, G. A. (1969). Psychology as a means of promoting human welfare. 
American Psychologist, 24: 1063-1075. 
 
Miller, A.G.(2009). Reflections on 'Replicating Milgram' (Burger 2009), 
American Psychologist, 64(1): 20-27. 
 
Orne, M. T., & Holland, C. H. (1968). On the ecological validity of laboratory 
deceptions. International Journal of Psychiatry, 6: 282-293. 
 
Owens, C. (2008). On Reading Žižek: Notes for Lacanian Clinicians. 
International Journal of Žižek Studies, 2(4). 
 
Parker*, I. (2000). Obedience. Granta, 71(4): 99-125. 
 
Parker, I. (2004). Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction. London: Pluto. 
 
De Vos, J. (2009) ‘Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment 
and Psychologization’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 7, pp. 223-246 
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/7.htm 
 
 
246 
 
Parker, I. (2005). Lacanian Discourse Analysis in Psychology: Seven 
Theoretical Elements, Theory & Psychology 15: 163–82. 
 
Parker, I. (2007). Revolution in psychology. Alienation to Emancipation. 
London: Pluto. 
 
Stam, H. J., Lubek, I., & Radtke, L. (1998). Repopulating social psychology 
texts: Disembodied 'subjects' and embodied subjectivity. In B. Bayer & J. 
Shotter (Eds.) Reconstructing the psychological subject: Bodies, practices and 
technologies. (pp. 153-186). London: Sage. 
 
Stavrakakis, Y. (2007). The Lacanian Left. Psychoanalysis, theory, politics. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Žižek, S. (1991). Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through 
Popular Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
Žižek, S. (1997). The Plague of Fantasies. New York: Verso. 
 
Žižek, S. (2000). The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. 
London: Verso. 
 
Žižek, S. (2005). Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle. London: Verso. 
 
Žižek, S. (2006). Burned by the sun. In: Žižek, S. (ed) Lacan: The Silent 
Partners. London: Verso: 217-230. 
 
 
 
Biographic Details: 
 
Jan De Vos has worked for several years as a clinical psychologist. 
Currently, he is a researcher at the Centre for Ethics and Value Inquiry 
(CEVI, Ghent University) and is preparing a PhD in philosophy on 
“Psychological Subjectivity in Late Modernity.” He has published several 
articles on psychologization. He has studied Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
 
Address for Correspondence:  
 
Centre for Ethics and Value Inquiry (CEVI)  
Department of Philosophy & Moral Science 
Ghent University 
Blandijnberg 2, B-9000 Gent. Belgium 
+32 (0)9 264 39 75 
JanR.DeVos@ugent.be 
